Standing Committee D

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Licensing Bill [Lords]

Clause 143 - Allowing children into licensed premises

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 445, in
clause 143, page 77, line 35, at beginning insert— 
 '( ) In pursuit of the licensing objective in section 5(2)(d), children under the age of 14 are not permitted to enter nightclubs.'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 447, in 
clause 143, page 77, line 36, leave out '14' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 448, in 
clause 143, page 77, line 37, at end insert— 
 '(1A) A person commits an offence if he permits children under the age of 14 to enter licensed premises when unaccompanied by an adult over the age of 18.'.
 Amendment No. 446, in 
clause 143, page 77, line 40, leave out 'nightclubs;'.
 Amendment No. 449, in 
clause 143, page 77, line 42, at end insert— 
 '(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.'.

Malcolm Moss: Good morning, Mr. Benton, and welcome once again to our Committee, which is now in its last stages; I shall make no comment on that.
 Amendments Nos. 445, 446, which is consequential to 445, and 449 can be taken in sequence. Notwithstanding the Government's stated intention in an earlier debate to delete clause 143, we want to debate the amendments on the basis of putting forward the arguments that we think should be taken on board before that fairly drastic action is taken. 
 The clause was inserted in the other place—by a fairly substantial vote, if my memory serves me correctly. The Lords put in an age limit of 14 for children who must be accompanied by adults in licensed premises. We have considered that. Through amendment No. 445, we are attempting to ensure that the protection of children from harm goes a stage further and that children under 14 are not permitted to enter nightclubs, with or without an adult. Amendment No. 449 is consequential on that and would allow a fairly severe penalty to be imposed where that is allowed to happen. A big distinction can be made between minors going into pubs and clubs, particularly if supervised by adults, and going to nightclubs. 
 Amendment No. 447 takes a different line and would change the age limit from 14 to 18. The police advisers who are helping us with the Bill suggested that to us. I shall come to the gist of their powerful arguments later. The simple change from 14 to 18 would allow us to set a particular limit clearly. That would put the onus and responsibility on the licensee, who, when applying for their licence, would have to give a positive reason why they wanted children under 18 to be present. 
 As the group of clauses stands, licensees could be put under pressure to make their premises as unrestricted as possible to compete in the marketplace with other local establishments, irrespective of whether the licensees feel comfortable with that or even believe that it is right in principle. Surely that promotes the availability of an environment that can, and will in some cases, put children in danger. All licensed premises seem to be caught in the same net, from pubs to off-licences, supermarkets, and possibly nightclubs, including lap-dancing nightclubs. Presumably, it is okay under the Bill for unaccompanied children drinking Coke to play bar billiards in a room adjoining the lap-dancing stage far away from the bar. Mixed and contradictory, not to say confused, messages are coming from the Government. On the one hand, clause 148 makes it a criminal offence for a person under the age of 18 to consume alcohol on licensed premises, the fine for such action being that of level 3, which is £1,000. That is a huge fine to impose. On the other hand, the Bill seems to encourage allowing children of any age into pubs and clubs and saying, ''Come and share the ambience and savour the atmosphere, but don't dare even think about consuming half a pint of bitter. You will be immediately criminalised.'' 
 Is that any different from encouraging young people to visit cannabis cafés and saying to them, ''Soak up the atmosphere, enjoy the social scene, but don't you dare be tempted.''

Mark Hoban: Passive smoking.

Malcolm Moss: Yes, secondary smoking would come into it.
 Let us remember that we are dealing with liberalising the licensing hours to 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Are the Government not placing an invidious burden on licensees who have to decide whether their premises are suitable or unsuitable for children? The guidance notes make clear the responsibility of licensees. Paragraph 4.25 states: 
''Nothing in a statement of licensing policy should limit the access of children to such premises unless it is necessary for the prevention of harm to children.''
 To prohibit the access of unaccompanied children, licensees are obliged—almost forced—to admit that their premises are so inadequate or unsuitable that they cannot guarantee the prevention of harm to children. They are really saying, ''I don't want children in my pub because that is the way I can prevent them from coming to any harm.'' Who will admit that?

Kim Howells: Given the morass of legislation that deals with children entering licensed premises, will the
 hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the onus is entirely on the licensee to prevent a child from doing so? Is he saying that that should continue?

Malcolm Moss: No, I am not saying that the present situation should continue. I acknowledge what the Minister means by its inadequacy. It is unclear and can be interpreted in different ways. We support the Government trying to put into legislation something that is more clear cut and practical. I am not sure that they have yet got that right. I do not deny that the issue is complex.
 The licensee has been given the responsibility of saying why his premises are unsuitable. He is not likely to admit that. What signals would that send out to the licensing authority or councils of the licensing committee? We are in serious danger of giving blanket approval for allowing young children unrestricted access to licensed premises by default. What sort of law promotes the negative at the expense of the positive? 
 The other major contradiction is that the Government are trying to reduce alcohol consumption, especially among young people, while they are actively encouraging a policy under the Bill that enables young people to have easier access to licensed premises. The proposals do not have the unqualified support of those involved with children and young people. I refer to a letter from the Children's Society, which was sent when such matters were discussed in the other place. It states: 
''In relation to this amendment, we do think that it is important to stress the fact that creating child-friendly and family-friendly environments requires a commitment to ensuring that there are benefits to be gained for children—not simply relying on the idea that children's presence will have a positive effect on adults. Children may become intimidated by the environment and behaviour around them and in the absence of a parent or carer there arise many questions about how the licensee can and should respond to them. For example, what should be the pub licensee's response to an upset unaccompanied eight year-old turning up in a bar at 11 pm asking to be served a soft drink? By what means might a licensee appropriately seek to remove a child from their premises, and should they just leave them outside? What, if any, is the licensee's responsibility if he or she notices a group of young teenage girls on the receiving end of seduction attempts by older men on their premises? There are many wider questions of children's interests, care and development that are not addressed by a licensing policy which presumes in favour of children's unrestricted access, and relies on licensees' discretion.''
 The prevention of harm to children should be predicated on more than the good will, good intentions or competence of a licensee, who may not be personally present at critical times, when that responsibility may fall on the shoulders of the designated premises supervisor. As I said, clause 143 was a new clause voted through in the other place. I alluded to the sizeable majority. The voting was 184 votes for the amendment and only 111 against—a majority of 73 votes out of a total of 295 cast. That was far from an insignificant majority in the circumstances. 
 The police have lobbied us to have the limit raised from 14 years of age to 18 to increase the default position. They share our view that setting any age limit under 18 runs the risk of giving the wrong impression, 
 particularly to young people. We have only to look at the evidence that has come to light since the talk about cannabis. Many young people living on housing estates in parts of London believe that cannabis is now legal. If we liberalise the licensing laws too far, they will quickly presume that it is all right for them to drink at an early age and to go into those premises. The presumption should be that unaccompanied access is not allowed unless the licensee specifies the conditions under which he could control access. If we are trying to make pubs children friendly places, we must ensure that access is controlled and under the aegis of adults, preferably their family, in what we want to promote as ''family friendly'' environments. 
 To remove the clause as the Government propose will remove any constraints on the system. Such is the opposition in the other place that the Government could face another defeat if they go ahead with their proposals. In discussions with the Opposition in the other place, there was strong feeling on that issue, which was raised in Committee and on Third Reading. The Government must be cautious and tread carefully in an attempt to satisfy the needs of the other place and those people who are speaking strongly in favour of the change, and to take on board what the police are saying. 
 The police are saying firmly to us that there should be discretion, that 18 years of age should be the default position and that if the Government intend to allow children below that age to enter, licensees must say clearly and unequivocally how they would deal with that situation and control it and fulfil the requirements that we endorse of prevention of harm to children. We accept that it is a complicated issue, but to leave it open ended as the Government propose would not fulfil the requirements that society will demand when it hears that there is a deal on restricted access in many cases. Those who deal with children's issues are not happy about that either.

Kim Howells: Welcome back to the Committee, Mr. Benton.
 We have already debated many of the issues raised by the group of amendments. Committee members have already deleted clause 143 during the clause stand part debate on it and clause 151 as part of the debate on clause 5 on licensing objectives. That gives a debate on the amendments an academic quality but, as the hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Moss) said, the Committee attaches considerable importance to issues affecting children. 
 As I said when we were debating licensing objectives, part of the problem is that few people understand, and even when they do, they cannot comprehend the logic of, the current regulatory framework for children—a point that the hon. Gentleman acknowledged. The current framework allows a five-year-old to drink spirits, provided that the drink is bought by an adult and consumed away from the bar area. That could be a few feet away from the main serving counter of a pub. It is a framework that allows clubs to provide alcohol for children, because that is the law—a framework that allows a child of seven to enter a nightclub and stay there until 2 am, provided that they keep away from the bar area. 
 It is time to change that framework. The question is how should we do it? 
 I acknowledge that it is not an easy situation, as the hon. Gentleman said; it is difficult and complex. It is shot through with anomalies which present dangers to children and we need to do something about it. 
 On Report in another place, the House of Lords inserted clause 143. The change did not provide the flexible and responsive framework that we want to achieve. Among other things, clause 143 raises a raft of issues about the definition of licensed premises in subsection (2). That is an important matter. The amendments that we are discussing do nothing to escape those definitional problems. The term ''public house'' does not exist in licensing law. Most public houses are premises with full justices' on-licences, but so are many hotels, restaurants and a wide variety of bars. ''Nightclub'' is also a meaningless term that does not exist in licensing law. It is generally regarded as a premises holding a full justices' on-licence, a public entertainment licence permitting music and dancing and a special hours certificate allowing sales of alcohol up to 2 am, and 3 am in the west end—that is the west end of London, not Pontypridd. Many hotels hold all three permissions so that they can hold wedding parties, and a few community halls might hold the same. Clearly they are not all ''nightclubs''. 
 Throughout the development of the Bill, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I have been keen to take into account the views of organisations that have an interest in the protection of children from harm and to consider how those can best be reflected in the legislation and in guidance to achieve the right environment for children. We have consulted a range of bodies, including the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Children's Society—the hon. Gentleman read from its letter—the Methodist Church, the Salvation Army, Turning Point, Alcohol Concern, the Association of Directors of Social Services and the Association of Chief Police Officers. The outcome was the set of proposals that the Secretary of State outlined to the House on 24 March. Those represent a balanced package, which, where appropriate, will ensure access to licensed premises by children in a family friendly environment, while providing them with protection. 
 As I said in our discussions on clause 5, the protection of children from harm is a key licensing objective. With regard to that objective, to ensure that there is expert input to licensing decisions, we have added the local area child protection committees or their successor bodies to the list of responsible authorities that are notified of and can make representations on all licensing applications—new ones or variations—and that can raise issues of concern relating to any of the licensing objectives through the review of provisions at any time. These are strong and positive additions to the process and I hope that they will be welcome. 
 The organisations that we consulted also took the view that it was not appropriate for the Bill to refer to age limits in relation to access by children to licensed 
 premises. We concur with that view, which is why we overturned clause 143. I have also undertaken to expose more of our thinking by producing a further draft of the guidance, in so far as that refers to children, on Report. 
 Clause 143 was intended to focus our efforts on limiting unsupervised access by children under the age of 14 to premises where alcohol consumption is the primary purpose. There are a number of problems with the proposals in the clause. How does the licensee ensure the age of a child? What proof of age is robust and not open to forgery? We do not have identity cards at present and we do not require children to carry them.

Malcolm Moss: Surely that argument applies to the age of 18 as much as to 14?

Kim Howells: That is correct. That is why, in practice, the police take a relaxed view of the 18 age limit. They know what is going on in the pubs on their patch. The hon. Gentleman described a situation in which teenage girls are wooed by men over the age of 18. The police know that that goes on and I have seen that happen in pubs on my own patch. I doubt if there is a Member in this room who can put his or her hand over their heart and say, ''Under-age drinking does not go on in any pub in my constituency.'' Of course it does and of course the police know about it. That is one of the things that we have to take into account. I am sure that all of us have discussed these issues with the police.
 Under-age drinking is a great blight on many of our communities. Some companies take a cynical approach—we have mentioned it in past debates on the sale of alcopops and so forth—by targeting young people who have not developed a taste for certain forms of alcohol that take a bit of getting used to, such as beer. As a consequence of action taken by the Portman Group and other companies, that has dropped off. We no longer see that sort of cynical marketing and I am glad about that. However, alcohol was marketed at younger people and often at people under the age of 18. The police were concerned about that, but I have never yet met a policeman who has told me, ''If I find somebody in a pub who is under the age of 18, I always have them thrown out.''

Andrew Turner: The Hampshire constabulary recently made it clear to me that the key difficulty with that situation was not a lack of will, but a lack of capacity. By that, I do not mean that there was a shortage of police but that it was difficult to know whether someone under the age of 18 was unlawfully consuming alcohol on the premises when there were half a dozen drinks in front of 10 people—or half a dozen drinks in front of half a dozen people. In such circumstances, it is difficult to demonstrate which individual has been served drink unlawfully. The amendment does not perfectly solve that—neither does the clause before us—but it is a great deal better than having nothing.

Kim Howells: I am not sure what that contributes to the discussion.
 I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about the difficulty that police have when they go on 
 to a premises and ask questions. There will always be difficulties. I cannot remember when I had my first drink; we could go round the room asking everyone to swear that they never had a drink before the legal age, which is actually five. 
 If the emphasis were placed on an accompanying adult, could we be sure that that person would provide sufficient supervision of the children and act in the child's interest? The hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire gave us the example of teenage girls being taken into pubs by someone who is 18 or older who does not have the best of intentions about looking after the welfare of those young people—who could be 14, 15, 16 or 17.

Malcolm Moss: I hear what the Minister says, but it is usually much better to have a family member or adult present, rather than making the licensee or whoever is on the premises responsible for unaccompanied children.

Kim Howells: That is the case at the moment. It is the licensee who says, ''Sorry—out. You can't come in.'' That is the law. In my experience, it is not family members who take young girls of 16 or 17 into pubs; they usually go in as gangs or with their boyfriends, who may or may not be 18. The boyfriends may feel that they can convince the landlord or barman that they are 18. The situation is fluid at present.
 We have concerns about trying to define an establishment, the primary purpose of which is the consumption of alcohol. Earlier, I noted the many shades of grey between the extremes of licensed premises in terms of their suitability for access by children. For example, the profit margins of some licensed premises in my constituency depend on selling food—in shorthand, let us call those gastropubs. Since the drink-driving laws, they are dependent on food. Many pubs, especially those in rural areas, do not have a hinterland of densely populated streets and would find it difficult to survive if they could not sell food to families. How would gastropubs fit in? When such businesses can earn more from food than from alcohol sales, what is their primary purpose? 
 We need to ensure that our new licensing system is responsive and flexible. The food sales in such establishments may be limited to certain days—perhaps Friday, Saturday and Sunday—but earn them enough money to carry them through the rest of the week. 
 Amendments Nos. 445 and 446 would respectively add a new subsection providing that children under the age of 14 are not permitted to enter nightclubs, and would delete nightclubs from the list of defined premises under subsection (2). No entry would be permissible under the age of 14, even when accompanied by an adult. I have already explained the problem of definition. The term ''nightclub'' does not exist under licensing definitions. Even planning does not use the term, but refers to ''dance halls''. Therefore, if a hotel uses its nightclub premises as the venue for a wedding dinner and dance, children under 14 will be banned on pain of a severe penalty. We need 
 to be aware that using such vague definitions could drag many venues into wholly unjustified prohibition. 
 Licensed premises of all types are thinking about diversity. They may hold events one night of the week at which few would be worried about the presence of children, accompanied or otherwise. On another night, however, we would want all children excluded. Flexibility is the key; we must recognise that in the Bill. 
 Amendment No. 447 would require all children under 18 to be accompanied by adults when at public houses, nightclubs and any similar establishment in which the primary purpose is the consumption of alcohol. Nightclubs, however, would not be included if the amendment were read with amendments Nos. 445 and 446. The amendment repeats our earlier debates, but with the term ''under 18'' being replaced with ''under 14''. That solves none of the problems that I described. 
 The problems of definition and inflexibility might give potential encouragement to unscrupulous and possibly dangerous adults to offer to accompany children. That does not make good sense. 
 Amendments Nos. 448 and 449 would create a new offence of permitting a child under the age of 14 to enter when unaccompanied by an adult over the age of 18. That would impact on the managers of local premises. The penalty would be a fine not exceeding £5,000. The offence is as flawed as the main proposal in the amendments. 
 Although I sense that I have not satisfied the hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire, I hope he understands that we are concerned that this central theme of the proposed legislation will be reinforced by our proposals and that those will be flexible enough to ensure that people in the trade are not driven out of business by the proposals in the amendments. Nevertheless, with the co-operation of all the responsible bodies and of those who are concerned about children's welfare, the provisions will be a vast improvement on the present system. Children will be better protected and, as a consequence, the country will be a more civilised place in which to live.

Malcolm Moss: I thank the Minister for his contribution and for repeating some of the arguments that we have already debated. I understand that clause 143 has not yet been voted out. Indeed, we have not debated it. I am not sure how can we table amendments for something that does not exist. Perhaps the Chair will rule on that. I suspect that the vote is yet to come.
The Chairman indicated assent.

Malcolm Moss: I see a nod from the Chair, so that is correct. I accept that clause 143, as inserted in the Bill in the other place, is not the perfect solution. I am not even sure that the Lords believed that that was the case. There was, however, a deep desire to find a practical, sensible way forward that met the aspirations of the Bill—to protect children from harm—and at the same time bring about some flexibility and liberalise access for children in many situations. Those on both sides of the argument agree about the aim and purpose of what we are attempting to do, but it remains to be concluded whether the Bill,
 which will be amended presently after the vote, deals correctly with those requirements.
 The police have told us that, in an attempt to go along with a more flexible system, they would be happy for there to be some discretion. Their main argument, which I tried to put forward in my general comments in the clause stand part debate, is that the Bill presumes at present that any child can gain access to a licensed premises, even if that means a three-year-old tottering in. There are no limits on age. There is a presumption that there should be access, unless the licensee writes to the licensing authority and says, ''I will not, or cannot, allow children of a certain age in, because my premises are unsuitable. I cannot sign up to the prevention of children from harm.'' They may not be able to sign up because their pub is situated in a particular place, I do not want to be too specific, because I might upset people. All hon. Members can think of local pubs that are unsuitable for children, because of the nature of the people who go in them. The police can tell us in which pubs criminals, petty thieves and drug dealers hang out. We would certainly not want our children going into places like that if we could avoid it. The onus is on the licensees to say why their premises are unsuitable.

Kim Howells: I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but does he realise that we are not talking about the granting or modification of a licence in a vacuum? We have gone through clause after clause about the responsible bodies that can be part of the process of deciding whether premises are suitable for a young person to be admitted to. If the various responsible bodies—including, primarily, the police—know that a place is unsuitable for a young person, that condition could be attached to that licence. There is nothing to prevent that from happening. We are not talking about a vacuum; the provisions are part of a precise process.

Malcolm Moss: I hear what the Minister says, and I have no doubt that in a perfect world, that is what would happen. However, this is not a perfect world, and things go wrong; otherwise we would not need this legislation. The police are saying that they would rather turn things round and set an age limit of, say, 18, so that no child or minor under that age would be allowed in a pub unaccompanied unless the licensee positively says, ''If I allow people under that age to come in unaccompanied, I will do the following, and I can sign up to the licensing objective of the prevention of harm to children.'' That is a more positive approach, because the presumption is that pubs and licensable premises are not usually the ideal places for unaccompanied children to be. The presumption would be that that is not something that we condone in society, although we recognise that there will be a host of situations and opportunities—

Nick Harvey: Surely a landlord can exercise his discretion in deciding whether to admit children at the door. He does not have to go to the licensing authority to get its cover for having a policy of not admitting children. He does not have to make a negative case against himself to the extent that the hon. Gentleman suggests; he can simply decide, as a
 matter of preference, whether he wants children in his pub.

Malcolm Moss: He will be measured by the licensing objective of preventing harm to children. I am simply saying that it will be a heavy responsibility for licensees if they have to admit that they cannot prevent that harm because of the nature of their pub or the people who go there. However, if things were turned round the other way, licensees could be more positive, and say, ''We want young children in here in these circumstances, and we can and will meet the licensing objectives through what we do positively.'' It is not just me saying that; ACPO made strong representations to say that it would prefer the Bill to be worded in that way.
 I shall be happy to withdraw the amendment. It was only a probing amendment to enable us to have another discussion on the subject. The matter will be returned to in the other place, make no mistake about it. It would be helpful if the Minister would take on board some of the points that we raised, or go back to the police and have further discussions with them.

Kim Howells: I want to reinforce the point made by the hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey). Essentially, the public, whatever their age, are entering private premises. The licensee, both now and in future, can say, ''Sorry, I don't want you in here.'' That happens regularly, and not just to people who are considered to be under age. In London I live next door to licensed premises where, until the ownership changed, the landlady, who was famous in the area, had excluded half of the locals—I am glad to say that I was not one of them. She was notorious, and very choosy about whom she would allow in her pub, presumably because she had made enough money in the past to decide who could come in.
 The hon. Gentleman has misrepresented the system. The operating schedule must set out the steps that a licensee must take to protect children from harm if he wants to allow them in. If he does not take those required sensible steps, the police, the local area child protection committee or local parents can make representations and ask the licensing authority to impose conditions that restrict children's entry or exclude them. We are proposing a belt-and-braces approach, which does not currently exist, other than—as the hon. Member for North Devon reminded us—in the good common sense of licensees, who can exclude children from pubs.

Malcolm Moss: I had more or less finished my comments. I want to withdraw the amendment, but I ask the Minister to take another look at the matter and have further discussions with the police, who still appear to have some concerns. I take on board what the Minister says; it is helpful clarification. However, there is still disquiet out there and, in a difficult and complex situation, it should be acknowledged that it is preferable to reach an accepted view. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 143 disagreed to. 
 Clause 144 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 145 - Allowing the sale of alcohol to children

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 455, in
clause 145, page 78, line 41, leave out 'any member or' and insert 'an'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 467, in
clause 149, page 81, line 37, leave out 'any member or' and insert 'an'.

Malcolm Moss: These are probing amendments. Amendment No. 455 relates to clause 145, and the consequential amendment, No. 467, applies to clause 149. They relate to the sale of alcohol to children. Clause 145(4) refers to
''any member or officer of the club who at the time of the supply is present on the relevant premises''.
 Reading that, one feels that the a member of a club who is quietly playing snooker in one of the rooms should not be hauled out and held responsible for someone being served alcohol who should not have been. Certainly, an officer of the club should take on that responsibility. The amendment is intended simply to probe the Government about why they think that a member who just happens to be there should take on that responsibility. Will that be a nominated member, who is in control on a particular evening at a particular time? 
 Should we not devolve responsibility to an officer of the club? That would probably mean that an officer from that committee should be present at all times, on some sort of rota system, to ensure that the laws are upheld. Why should that responsibility devolve to an innocent member who is quietly going about his or her own business and not taking much notice of what is being done behind the bar in terms of serving alcohol to children?

Kim Howells: We discussed the principle behind these amendments during our debate on amendment No. 398 at an earlier stage of the Committee's proceedings. As the hon. Gentleman said, these are probing amendments intended to tease out something about the position of clubs and club members.
 In recognition of the special status of clubs, which are private premises to which public access is restricted, the Bill provides for a lighter touch for qualifying clubs than for other licensed premises. Clubs tend to be self-regulating to some degree, 
 usually through a code of conduct or another form of club rules, and that is why they benefit from a certain degree of relaxation—for example, there is no mandatory condition for a personal licence holder to authorise the supply of alcohol, there is no requirement for a designated premises supervisor if the club is to supply alcohol, and rights of entry for enforcement purposes are somewhat restricted. 
 In return, we expect qualifying clubs and their members to behave responsibly and to carry out some of the enforcement work that would be looked after by the more stringent requirements of a premises licence. The Bill places responsibility on the shoulders of club members and officers of the club: they must ensure that the club is run in good order. That is why a club is a club. 
 Clause 145 sets out the offence of knowingly allowing the sale or supply of alcohol to children. In the case of premises covered by a club premises certificate, that offence can be committed both by a person who works at the premises in a capacity that authorises him to prevent the supply of alcohol, and by any member or officer of the club who, at the time that the supply takes place, is present on the premises in a capacity that enables him to prevent it. 
 In a similar way, clause 149 sets out the offence of knowingly allowing the delivery of alcohol to children where the alcohol has been sold on the premises or supplied on the premises by or on behalf of a club or to the order of a member of the club. Again, in the case of premises covered by a club premises certificate, the offence can be committed both by a person who works at the premises in a capacity that authorises him to prevent the supply and by any member or officer of the club who at the time of the delivery is present on the premises in a capacity that enables him to prevent it. 
 I said at the outset that clubs were self-governing. They largely work out their own rules, codes of practice and so forth. It may be the case that they will ensure that people are present every evening who are responsible for moments such as the one under discussion.

Malcolm Moss: I think that this all hinges on the words,
''in a capacity which enables him to prevent it.''
 We need clarification of that. Which member is it to be? Will it be a nominated member? Subsection (4)(b) says ''any member''. The innocent member who is quietly playing snooker could be held responsible. The word ''capacity'' needs to be defined. What is that capacity? That is crucial.

Kim Howells: Yes, absolutely. I have constructed a little scenario that may help the Committee—a vignette that may illustrate what I am talking about.
 Amendments Nos. 455 and 467 would restrict the susceptibility to committing the offences under clauses 145 and 149 to those who work at the premises and an officer of the club, rather than to members or officers and those working there. The Government cannot accept the amendments. The arguments are the same in each case. I shall illustrate them by focusing on an 
 offence under clause 145, ''Allowing the sale of alcohol to children''. 
 I do not want to refer to the Isle of Wight again, but let us use the Freshwater Conservative club as an example. Let us say that although a member—let us call him Tom—is in charge of the bar, he does not serve there. Joe is employed as a barman. Kevin, who is 16, comes in to the bar to play bridge. He is a strange boy; I do not know any 16-year-olds who play bridge, although I used to enjoy a game myself. After half an hour of being dealt poor hands, Kevin slinks off to the bar and, because he is the kind of youth who likes bridge, he asks Joe for a gin and tonic. Joe, who is unsure about Kevin's age, asks Tom, who is also playing bridge and knows Kevin, if it is okay to give him a G and T. Tom replies that Kevin is 16 and that it cannot do him any harm. The supply takes place, money changes hands and Kevin walks off with his G and T. 
 Tom is clearly in the wrong, because he knows Kevin is 16. He is in charge of the bar, present on the premises and is in a position to prevent the illegal supply. Amendment No. 455, however, would mean that he would not technically be committing the offence, because he is a member of the club, not an officer. Under clause 144, Joe would be committing the offence of selling alcohol to children, because at the time of supply he knew that Kevin was 16. He may also have committed an offence under clause 145(4)(a), assuming that he was in a position authorising him to prevent the supply. Tom has ultimate responsibility for the bar; he has the authority to prevent the supply, but as a result of the amendment he would not be guilty of an offence under clause 145. 
 That is not acceptable. The additional safeguard of the offence of knowingly allowing the supply of alcohol to children by a member of the club is vital. This is about balancing rights and responsibilities. Qualifying clubs benefit from a lighter touch under the Bill. However, that light touch is balanced by the requirement for clubs and their members to exercise responsibility appropriately. 
 The hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire mentioned that a member of the club might be in another room playing a game of snooker. He might not even know what is going on at the bar. After we debated clubs last week, I talked to various hon. Members who are members of clubs and involved in the club movement. All those people told me that clubs operate according to rules or standing orders, and that a club member is responsible for the conduct of the club during an evening. They have operated very successfully along those lines. If there is any doubt, the barman or other person supplying the alcohol will know who to go to for advice. That puts the onus on the club to ensure that its rules and systems for ensuring that infringements do not take place are adhered to, and that children who should not be supplied with alcohol in that way do not receive it. That is a positive way of protecting children in pubs under the new arrangements.

Malcolm Moss: I thank the Minister for painting the picture of Tom, Kevin and Joe. In the example that he gave, if Tom were in charge of the bar, he would
 probably be an officer of the club or a member of the committee. I extend ''officer'' to mean any member of the committee rather than only the secretary or the chairman. Joe is patently behind the bar and his situation is covered in subsection 4(a), which states:
''a person who works on the premises in a capacity . . . which authorises him to prevent the supply''.
 Anyone working behind the bar is in the front line, because it is his decision whether to pull the pint or pour the gin and add the tonic. In the analogy that we were given, it seems to me that Tom was in the wrong. He used his position as an officer of the club or a member of the committee to override what Joe instinctively knew was wrong—that he should not supply alcohol to an under-age individual. 
 I can see that the ''any member'' provision works if the club rules state clearly that someone has to be responsible at all times on club premises. I would have thought that would be a committee member or an officer rather than ''any member'', but I am happy to accept that it is important that there is somebody there who is ultimately responsible in any given situation. With the assurances given by the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 145 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 146 - Sale of liqueur confectionery

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 456, in
clause 146, page 79, line 5, leave out '16' and insert '18'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 457, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 7, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 458, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 10, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 459, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 13, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 460, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 15, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 461, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 18, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Amendment No. 462, in 
clause 146, page 79, line 23, leave out '16' and insert '18'.

Malcolm Moss: These are probing amendments to ascertain from the Government why the age limit is 16 for the consumption of liqueur confectionery, not 18 as in our amendments. Can the Minister tell us whether the clause sets a precedent, or is 16 the age in the existing law? Has he had representations from the trade or any other quarter suggesting that he should set the age limit at 16? Clause 146 is related to clause 188, which defines alcohol for the purposes of the Bill. Subsection (2) gives a definition of ''liqueur confectionery'' that is so complicated that anyone attempting to police or regulate that matter would find it almost impossible to know exactly what he had in
 his possession, or what the offending 16-year-old had in their possession.
 Clause 188 states that 
'' 'liqueur confectionery' means confectionery which—
(a) contains alcohol in a proportion not greater than 0.2 litres of alcohol (of a strength not exceeding 57%) per kilogram of the confectionery, and
(b) either consists of separate pieces weighing not more than 42g or is designed to be broken into such pieces for the purpose of consumption''.
 That is complex. I wonder if it is over-regulation, and whether we need all that detail.

Mark Hoban: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. Like him, I was rather perturbed about why that was necessary, but I have done a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation. If you ate 450 g of liqueur chocolates, you would drink the same quantity of alcohol as that in a bottle of wine with a volume content of 12 per cent.

Kim Howells: And you would be very sick.

Mark Hoban: I do not mean you, Mr. Benton. I am not sure whether people suffering from the side effects would be suffering from excess chocolate or excess alcohol.

Malcolm Moss: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that illumination. It might be helpful to go a little further into it. Can he tell us what 450 g looks like? Would it be one bar of chocolate or several?

Mark Hoban: It is equivalent to a pound of chocolate in imperial measures—and that is a significant quantity of chocolates with alcohol centres for anyone to consume.

Malcolm Moss: Again, I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The amendments are probing. They are designed to find out from the Government the reason for the provision. Was it in the Licensing Act 1964? Are the Government simply replicating that, or are there some new developments that we ought to know about?

Kim Howells: This is a fascinating subject. I know people who could easily eat 450 g of chocolate at one sitting.
 Amendments Nos. 456 to 462 would make it an offence to sell liqueur confectionery to anyone under the age of 18. The offence of selling liqueur confectionery to anyone under the age of 16, which has existed since 1961, would thereby be extended. As far as I am aware, that offence has worked well for the past 42 years. There have been no complaints or concerns about its extent under the Bill in any of the consultations or in my postbag. I should be interested to hear if any other hon. Members have had correspondence about it. 
 Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to prevent people of 16 or 17 years of age, who can legally marry, join the Army or ride a moped, from buying their grandma a box of whisky liqueur chocolates at Christmas. Liqueur chocolates are not a source of illicit alcohol for young people. The alcohol content is controlled by law, and there is an existing protection for children below the age of 16. The Committee may 
 also be fascinated to know that there are and will remain tougher controls on alcoholic jellies and fruit in alcohol, which can be purchased only by someone aged 18 or over, because of their higher strength. I shall explore those ranges on the supermarket shelves. 
 In short, I am not aware that the sale of liqueur confectionery to 16 or 17-year-olds causes problems. The offence as originally provided for has worked well. There is no case for a change, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment. If he does, I will consider seriously giving him a little strip of liqueurs for Christmas.

Malcolm Moss: On the basis of that bribe, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 147 - Purchase of alcohol by or on behalf of children

Mark Hoban: I beg to move amendment No. 450, in
clause 147, page 80, line 1, leave out 'or'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendment: No. 451, in
clause 147, page 80, line 2, at end insert 
 'or— 
 (c) a trading standards officer.'.

Mark Hoban: These are probing amendments to elicit from the Minister the range of people who can instruct someone under 18 to buy alcohol as part of an exercise to establish whether other retailers are complying with the law. The amendment was prompted by my sister, who is a trading standards officer. There is a clear delineation within the trading standards department between those who are trading standards officers and those who have attained weights and measures certificates. As we speak, my sister is sitting her examinations to obtain one of those certificates. Before that, she undertook exercises with under-16s to find out whether they would be able to buy cigarettes from newsagents and other outlets, and was successful in clamping down on that lawbreaking activity.
 I do not want those who do not possess qualifications in weights and measures to be prevented from conducting the same operations as they can currently conduct in relation to under-16s and the sale of cigarettes. All trading standards officers should be able to initiate operations in which people under 18 are used to buy alcohol to test whether pubs, or any other outlets, are in compliance with the rules. We must also ensure that trading standards officers enjoy the same protection under the law as weights and measures inspectors.

Kim Howells: I am sure that I reflect the feelings of all Committee members when I wish the hon. Gentleman's sister the best of luck in her examinations to obtain the weights and measures qualifications. As a former Minister in the Department of Trade and Industry, I have great admiration for trading standards officers and weights and measure
 departments, with whom I worked for three and a half years; they do a wonderful job.
 As the hon. Gentleman implied, clause 147 is an important part of the Bill. It re-establishes existing offences under the 1964 Act and, for the first time, extends them to actions of qualifying clubs—the successors to registered clubs in the 1964 Act—on club premises, where a club premises certificate is in force and where, at present, children over four are legally permitted to consume alcohol. 
 Perhaps more importantly, the clause provides that a child under 18 commits an offence if he or she buys, or attempts to buy, alcohol anywhere in England and Wales. An equivalent offence is established for the supply of alcohol in clubs. A disapplication is provided where the child is acting at the request of the police or trading standards officers engaged in test-purchasing operations, and it is to that element of the offence provision that amendments Nos. 450 and 451 would apply. 
 The amendments would exempt children under 18 from the offence of buying or attempting to buy alcohol if they had been asked to buy it by trading standards officers acting in the course of their duty. Trading standards officers are not creatures of statute, and have no statutory existence. Their statutory name is an inspector of weights and measures. It would be inappropriate to use that term in clause 147, as it would only cause confusion. We are aware that some local authorities employ individuals who carry out similar duties, but are not fully recognised inspectors of weights and measures. That does not mean that test-purchasing operations can be carried out in the field only by fully fledged inspectors. So long as an inspector has authorised the test-purchasing operation and, as part of that operation, made a request that certain children should be asked to attempt to purchase alcohol, the children would be exempt from the offences in question. I hope that with that reassurance, the hon. Gentleman will not press his amendments.

Mark Hoban: I am grateful for the Minister's reassurance, and I shall convey his message to my sister when I see her at the weekend. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 463, in
clause 147, page 80, leave out line 22.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 454, in 
clause 147, page 80, line 23, leave out 'or cider' and insert 
 ', cider or spirit based coolers'.
 Amendment No. 453, in 
clause 147, page 80, line 26, leave out 
 'an individual aged 18 or over' 
 and insert 'the relevant person'.
 Amendment No. 452, in 
clause 147, page 80, line 28, leave out subsection (6).
 Amendment No. 464, in 
clause 148, page 81, leave out line 6.
 Amendment No. 465, in 
clause 148, page 81, line 9, leave out 
 'an individual aged 18 or over' 
 and insert 'the relevant person'.

Malcolm Moss: The amendment would leave out clause 147(5)(b). Subsection (5) states that subsection (4), which refers to the relevant person committing an offence, does not apply where that person is 18 or over, or is an individual aged 16 or 17. I am unsure why it is worded like that. Why does paragraph (a) not state that the relevant person is aged 16 or over? Why do the ages of 16 or 17 have to be made non-applicable to the offence in subsection (4)?
 Amendment. No. 464 is a consequential amendment that addresses clause 148(4)(a). The same question arises: why does the Bill state that the offences committed under clause 147(4) do not apply to people aged 16 or 17?

Mark Hoban: I wish to speak to four of the other amendments in this group.
 Amendment No. 454 would add adds what are popularly referred to as alcopops—''spirit based coolers''—to the list of drinks that 16 to 17-year-olds will be able consume. As the Minister has said, they are popular with young people. I am thankful to say that the targeting of such drinks at young people has been modified as a result of the work of the Portman Group. However, they are popular drinks among young people, and I find it difficult to understand why spirit-based coolers should be excluded from the list of drinks that young people can consume in accordance with the conditions set out in subsection (5). 
 The alcohol by volume content of Bacardi Breezer, which is the market leader in this area, is 5.1 per cent. That figure is 5 per cent. for Smirnoff Ice, which is another heavily marketed drink of that kind. WKD has a slightly higher alcohol content—5.5 per cent. Those figures should be compared with those for some of the drinks that the Bill allows young people to consume. London Pride—a very good bitter—has an alcohol content of 4.7 per cent. That figure is 5.3 per cent. for Strongbow, which could be consumed under the cider exemption. The alcohol content of a bottle of Jacob's Creek chardonnay—a wine that is often seen on the menus of pubs and restaurants—is 13 per cent. 
 Therefore, it appears that we are discriminating against spirit-based coolers—alcopops—by excluding them from the list of permitted drinks. I want the list to be expanded to reflect what people are drinking these days.

Jim Knight: Sadly, I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has teenage children, but I have children aged 12 and 14, and they are much more attracted to the alcopops that he has listed than they are to London Pride, which I would much prefer to drink, and the other beers and ciders to which he referred. The attraction of alcopops for young people is the reason behind the Government's thinking.

Mark Hoban: I was going to say that I was too young to have teenage children, but I am not sure how old the hon. Member for South Dorset (Jim Knight) is; I think
 that our ages are not dissimilar. However, although I do not have teenage children, I am aware that those drinks are attractive to young people.
 I remember that when I was a teenager, I would drink sweet German white wine, although I am ashamed to say so now. I did not like the taste of bitter at that time. I have since made up for that shortfall in consumption in my teenage years—[Hon. Members: ''Liebfraumilch?''] In fact that was the drink: hon. Members have raised a very sensitive subject. 
 I was a teenager more than 20 years ago, and at that time someone might have said that such sweet white wines were attractive to young people. That argument depends on what is available in any period: sweet cider was a popular drink at the teenage parties that I used to frequent. Over the years there have been many drinks of choice for young people who want their first taste of alcohol. We are talking about 16 and 17-year-olds consuming such drinks in the presence of someone over 18. One would hope that that would act as a regulator to the over-consumption of alcopops during a meal. As we are trying to modernise the licensing laws, we should modernise the drinks that young people are allowed to drink with a meal in the company of adults. 
 Amendment No. 453 deals with the issue of who accompanies those who are drinking. In subsection (5)(e) it would substitute 
''an individual aged 18 or over''
 for the term, ''the relevant person'', which is defined in subsection (4) as the person who is buying the alcohol. I would like it if the person buying the alcohol—''the relevant person''—were the person sitting alongside or accompanying the 16 and 17-year-olds drinking the alcohol that that person had bought. It would be wrong for someone not connected with the party drinking alcohol to purchase drinks for them. The amendment would link the responsibility for purchase with the responsibility for its consumption by 16 and 17-year-olds. 
 Amendment No. 452 would leave out subsection (6), so that the person purchasing alcohol, not only the person retailing it, would take responsibility for knowing whether it was legal for the person accompanying them to consume alcohol. Again, if it is an offence to sell alcohol to someone under age, the person who buys it on behalf of a 16 or 17-year-old who is not having a meal should bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

Kim Howells: Clause 147 re-establishes current offences under the Licensing Act 1964. It is a key offence provision. Subsection (1) says that a child
''under 18 commits an offence if . . . he buys or attempts to buy alcohol''
 anywhere in England and Wales. An equivalent offence is established for the supply of alcohol in clubs. Subsection (4) makes it an offence for an adult to buy or attempt to buy alcohol 
''for consumption on relevant premises''
 by a child under 18. An equivalent offence is created in respect of clubs. 
 ''Relevant premises'' means a place where a premises licence or a club premises certificate has effect or is in force, or a place that may be used for the sale of alcohol for a permitted temporary activity under the authority of a temporary event notice under part 5 of the Bill. As we have heard, the clause provides an exception to the latter offence for adults buying beer, wine or cider for 16 or 17-year-olds for consumption at a table meal in the company of adults. 
 As we have heard from the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Hoban), amendment No. 454 would include ''spirit based coolers'' in the list of alcoholic beverages that a 16 or 17-year-old could consume with a table meal. I admit that we thought think long and hard about the matter, and about the range of alcohol that should be included in the list. As the hon. Gentleman says, learning to drink moderately in the civilised atmosphere of a family meal should involve teaching and gaining an understanding of units of alcohol. That lies at the heart of the message that the Department of Health, for example, is keen to promote. 
 I recognise that beer and cider are available in strengths exceeding that of spirit-based coolers. Wine, of course, is considerably stronger, as the hon. Gentleman says. However, there is a psychological element to consider, too, and it was hinted at by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset. Beer, wine and cider are real drinks—[Interruption.] No, that sounds too macho. What I mean is that those drinks take a bit of getting used to, and do not taste like the lemonade that we may have been given as children. The problem with spirit-based coolers is that they strongly appeal to the young, because they often come in fruit flavours, and sometimes in bright colours, which make them seem little different from the soft drinks that most of us enjoyed as children—but they still make people drunk. They are easy to drink rapidly, and it is clear from the reports that we saw in the 1990s—we still see some now occasionally—that if they can be afforded, they tend to make people drunk rather quickly, because they do not require a taste to be acquired. 
 We will all remember the anxieties that developed about alcopops, which led to the further development of the Portman Group code of practice to which I paid tribute earlier.

Mark Hoban: I understand the concerns that the Minister has expressed. If the consumption of alcopops took place in isolation, I would accept those concerns—but we are talking about people consuming a meal, and alcohol being consumed in the company of adults over the age of 18. The parents or those who are accompanying the 16 or 17-year-olds should take some responsibility for the amount of alcohol that is consumed by those children, and its purchase.

Kim Howells: Yes, indeed; there is no question but that the adults with the children have an important role to play. We are using the shorthand term
 ''alcopops'', but if the logic of the hon. Gentleman's argument is based on the comparative strength of drinks as well as their popularity, will he go on the record as saying that children aged 16 should be free to drink a gin and tonic, a whisky and soda or a vodka and Red Bull, which are all weaker than a glass of wine? There are obvious reasons why the Government are reluctant to go down that path.

Mark Hoban: I am grateful to the Minister for raising the issue of mixed drinks. It was interesting to see that the alcohol content of pre-packaged mixed drinks varies. A Gordon's and tonic on sale in the supermarket has an alcohol content that is not dissimilar to that of Bacardi Breezers or WKDs. However a Greenalls pre-mixed gin and tonic is 10 per cent. alcohol by volume. The issue is being addressed inconsistently. If spirits were precluded from being purchased for young people, but other drinks could be, I would understand that. However, there is no consistent approach to how we determine which alcohol can and cannot be consumed by 16 and 17-year-olds.

Kim Howells: I hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but we have been precise about what 16 or 17-year-olds should be allowed to drink with a meal. They are allowed to drink wine, beer and cider, and nothing else. Problems would arise were we to introduce the hon. Gentleman's example of spirit-based coolers. I am not sure that it would send out the right message, and we would get into an argument about whether a drink's inclusion should be based simply on its strength. It would open up a wide range of drinks to young people. I am tempted to say that although young people may drink alcohol with a meal, I do not really want them to enjoy it.
 That is the puritan in me coming out, but I hope that the Committee understands what I mean. It should take some time to acquire a taste for alcohol. We should not just encourage people to drink it as part of a fruit mixer that does not taste of anything other than orange squash or whatever. That could be a dangerous step. 
 Amendment No. 453 would require that the person who bought the beer, wine and cider for any 16 and 17-year-old must also be the person accompanying them at the meal. Subsection (5) was drafted to be as flexible as possible for parents and family friends. It allows one adult to purchase the alcohol for consumption by the 16 and 17-year-old with a table meal and a different adult to sit with him throughout the meal. So one parent could purchase and leave, while the other stayed on at the meal. 
 Amendment No. 453 would introduce absolute rigidity for no purpose. Only the person paying for the alcohol with a meal can accompany the children. I am not sure that the hon. Member for Fareham intended that that degree of inflexibility would prevail in what we hoped would be a family friendly atmosphere. 
 Amendment No. 452 would delete subsection (6) and thereby remove the defence for any adult charged with offences under subsections (3) and (4) that he had no reason to suspect that the person was aged under 18. At present, we do not have national identity cards 
 in this country or Government-issued proof-of-age cards. As we discussed in the debate this morning, children sometimes carry a range of voluntary cards and some Government cards—such as photo driver licences—that serve that purpose. We certainly expect retailers to observe their duty and ensure that they are not selling to minors. 
 The offences in subsections (3) and (4) will generally be committed by people who are not in the licensed trade. Those include offences in which, for example, an ordinary member of the public meets an adult friend and his son, who looks well over 17, and offers to buy them a drink. Innocent of the fact that the son was only 17, he makes the purchase and becomes liable to prosecution. Subsection (6) provides the defence that he had no reason to suspect that the boy was under age. That defence would be inappropriate for people engaged in retail where higher standards must apply, but do we want to live in a society where we are regularly asking for proof of each other's ages in the sort of situation that I have described?

Mark Hoban: I want to draw the Minister's attention to a situation that the police in Fareham have described to me—the sale of alcohol through off-licences and particularly convenience stores with an alcohol licence. Somebody waiting outside will ask someone to buy alcohol on his behalf. According to the local police force, that is an important issue in certain parts of my constituency, where young people are obtaining alcohol through that route. Will those people who are doing the purchasing be able to rely on the defence in subsection (6) to avoid taking legal responsibility for their actions?

Kim Howells: I do not think that such people will be able to rely on the subsection because it relates to a specific occurrence that may happen inside the licensed premises in question. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman remembers that the example that he has given is already an offence. We have discussed the fact that when an adult knowingly buys alcohol for young people under age outside a shop, that is an offence and the adult will be caught for it. In doing that, we cannot do away with the defence in a situation such as the one that I described, where somebody could be prosecuted for buying a drink for the son of an old friend because he assumed that the son was 18 and not 17. There must be a defence there and we have to allow it. If the amendment were accepted, there would not be a defence. That is the difference. I hope that he recognises that there must be some flexibility.

Malcolm Moss: Does the Minister not agree that there is a contradiction in clause 147 between subsection (6) and the penalties for an offence outlined under subsection (7)(b), which states that
''in the case of an offence under subsections (3) and (4)'',
 the fine should not exceed ''level 5''? We are talking about £5,000, are we not? That is the top-level fine. Yet at the same time, the Minister makes a case under subsection (6) that there ought to be a defence if the person charged did not know that the individual was under 18. We cannot have both. We can be liberal and say that it is incredibly difficult to define age, and there are many cases when people do not remember to say, 
 ''Are you really 18?'' At the same time, if somebody slips through that net they get hammered with the top-level fine.

Kim Howells: Yes, I think that we can have it both ways. I trust the good sense of most magistrates and police officers, as I know the hon. Gentleman does. If somebody is supplying alcohol to young people outside a corner shop, a pub or an off-licence, they will know full well that they are under age. Why else would they be outside the premises that sells alcohol and not inside, ordering it for themselves? There must be a degree of flexibility and also penalties severe enough to ensure that, where those scurrilous individuals are caught, they can be prosecuted and hit very hard. Let us remember that that is the maximum penalty. If there is any doubt, there is no reason why they could not get a warning from the police, or the magistrates could fine them a good deal less than the maximum as a consequence of a successful prosecution.
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman agrees with me—we heard the example given by his hon. Friend the Member for Fareham—that the problem is serious. The supply of alcohol to children and young people outside licensed premises for them to consume elsewhere is something that society should not have to put up with. There ought to be a means of stopping it. 
 Amendments Nos. 464 and 463 would delete the reference to persons aged 16 and 17 from clauses 147 and 148. In clause 147, that would mean that no offence of buying or supplying alcohol for a person under 18 would be committed if the alcohol was beer, wine or cider bought for, or supplied to, a minor of any age for consumption at a table meal on relevant premises in the company of at least one adult. In clause 148, amendment No. 464 would mean that no offence would be committed by a minor who consumed alcohol in those circumstances, and no offence of permitting that consumption would be committed. 
 The Bill does not maintain the status quo. The present law allows children of 16 and 17 to buy and consume beer, porter, cider and perry with a table meal whether or not in the company of adults. In considering those issues, we took the view that children of those ages should no longer be free to purchase alcohol and that while they should be permitted to continue to consume the types of alcohol listed in the Bill, such consumption should take place only in the company of adults. We therefore made those provisions more restrictive, but added wine to the list of alcohol allowed. 
 Amendments Nos. 463 and 464 would allow that saving to apply to children of any age. I appreciate that there is an argument for teaching children to drink alcohol in a sensible and civilised way while young, so that by the time they are old enough to purchase alcohol themselves they may have acquired some respect for its effects. That may also help to remove some of the mystique and excitement that children can attach to alcohol consumption. We 
 should not ignore the risks that amendments Nos. 463 and 464 carry. Committee members may have in mind a cosy family group enjoying a meal out in a civilised restaurant, at which the kids enjoy sensible and conservative amounts of wine. However, accompanying adults will not always be parents, guardians and sensible aunts and uncles. 
 A 15-year-old girl at a meal with an 18-year-old boyfriend would be accompanied by an adult, but he might not always have her best interests at heart. Consider a group of schoolboys enjoying a pizza; one of them may be 18 and the others may be 14, but those boys would technically be accompanied by an adult. We must balance the risks against the potential benefits, to which I referred earlier, and decide on some limits. To allow children of any age to enjoy that privilege would be going too far. The right balance is to set a limit at 16. 
 Amendment No. 465 would require the person who bought or supplied the alcohol for the 16 or 17-year-old to be the same person who accompanied the minor or minors at the meal. That would extend to a child of any age, if read with amendments Nos. 463 and 464, which is unnecessarily restrictive. What would be gained by such a change? If I purchased the alcohol for my children—I still have one child who is 15—but had to leave the meal early because the Division bell was ringing, would it be unreasonable to leave them in the company of my wife or an adult relative? Would the alcohol that I bought for the children have to be returned to the waiter and held pending my return? That would be hopelessly inflexible, so I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Malcolm Moss: We have had a good debate on probing amendments. There is a discrepancy, however. I support my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham, who said that although some ciders and beers are very strong, they are still permitted because they are ciders and beers. Individuals could drink copious amounts of those beverages, whereas they might drink only a bottle or two of alcopops.
 We are grateful for the Minister's explanation and clarification on the age of 16 or 17, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Andrew Turner: I beg to move amendment No. 407, in
clause 147, page 80, line 27, at end insert— 
 '(5A) This section does not apply to the advance purchase of a set of goods and services that includes alcohol if no alcohol is subsequently supplied to or for the consumption of a person aged under 18.'.
 The amendment results from an approach by the Yacht Brokers, Designers and Surveyors Association, which comprises the Association of Brokers and Yacht Agents and the Yacht Designers and Surveyors Association. It also represents the Professional Charter Association, which in turn represents skippers of charter vessels who are not represented by the British Marine Industries Federation—also consulted on aspects of the Bill. Those organisations have about 125 members between them. 
 The YBDSA is concerned about package tours on vessels that include lunch or a meal with wine, which clearly constitutes a sale of alcohol. However, people can buy a family ticket for two adults and one, two or three children, including a drink with the meal. The YBDSA would like it to be made clear that it would not be an offence to sell such a ticket, as long as no minor was thereafter supplied with alcohol. The other provisions would apply as Ministers propose, but it should not be an offence to sell alcohol in that way simply because it is part of a package. 
 I do not know exactly how widespread the practice is, and perhaps there are ways round the problem, but buying a single ticket is a much more attractive proposition than buying a multiplicity of tickets. Paying once for an excursion is far more attractive than paying separately for the excursion, the meal and the drinks served with that meal. Of course, in many cases, buying a family ticket is substantially cheaper than buying tickets for those going on the excursion individually. That is why I tabled the amendment, which makes it clear that the clause 
''does not apply to the advance purchase of a set of goods and services that includes alcohol if no alcohol is subsequently supplied to or for the consumption of a person aged under 18.''.

Kim Howells: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving us advance notice of his concerns about this part of the Bill and his reasons for them.
 If, as part of a package tour on a boat, a lunch including wine was provided and paid for, the operator would need a premises licence or temporary event notice. If alcohol was sold to an adult—sales to minors, of course, being unlawful—no offence would be committed if an adult who had purchased the package on his behalf, and not as the child's agent, gave wine to a child. However, if the child consumed the alcohol on licensed premises, the child would commit an offence. The adult who purchased the alcohol for consumption by the child on licensed premises would commit another offence. Any boat operator who permitted that consumption by a child on the licensed premises would also commit an offence. 
 Boat operators in this country were previously exempt from such laws, and ensuring that children are not allowed to consume alcohol on any licensed premises is one reason why boats should be licensed. If boat operators are pressing for an exemption in respect of such offences, they are making a case, under our proposals, for the licensing of vessels. I want the hon. Gentleman to have that on record, so that he knows precisely where we stand. The answer will not please him, but that is our explanation of the question that he has raised.

Andrew Turner: I understand, of course, that the Government and I have a different view on the necessity of licensing vessels, but the amendment was tabled on the assumption that the rest of the Bill will go forward as the Government propose. As I understand it—perhaps the Minister will correct me if I have misunderstood—if an adult purchases a ticket for his family, including youngsters, and it includes a meal at which alcohol is to be served, no offence would be committed if alcohol were served to the youngster.

Kim Howells: If those arrangements are in place on a vessel, it must have a proper premises licence. That is what I am saying. I do not know whether that helps the hon. Gentleman, but it gives him the wider context. If a vessel has a premises licence, the rest of the conditions regarding the responsibilities of the holder of the premises licence come into play. That is where the issues that he put to the Committee are addressed.

Andrew Turner: I understand that the Government think that vessels must be licensed. I am not arguing about that, and the Minister has set it out that where a vessel is so licensed, it would be lawful to sell alcohol.
 The Minister said that the provisions of my amendment will be ''addressed''. I am unsure what he means by that. I had understood from his earlier response that if the vessel is licensed, and if the package is purchased by an adult, notwithstanding the fact that it may include wine, no offence would be committed by the people selling the package, the youngster or the adult. That goes further than I had anticipated in my amendment. I want the Minister to say that it is not an offence to sell or purchase such a package, so long as wine is not consumed by a person under 18 other than under the conditions provided for elsewhere in the Bill.

Kim Howells: May I repeat what I said to the hon. Gentleman in my previous answer? He is right to raise the matter again if he did not understand. Once the package has been sold to an adult, as sales to minors are unlawful, no offence would be committed if one of the adults who had purchased the package on his own behalf, rather than as the child's agent, gave that wine to a child.

Andrew Turner: Got it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mark Hoban: I cannot let the clause pass without raising the question of a table meal. What precisely does ''table meal'' mean? The Minister gave examples of situations in which food might be served and referred to people of various ages—between 16 and 18—consuming pizzas. If there is a group of people between the ages of 16 and 19, and the 16 and 17-year-olds have a sandwich in front of them, does that sandwich constitute a table meal and can they use it as a defence over consuming alcohol?

Kim Howells: It just so happens that I asked for and received an authoritative definition of what constitutes a table meal. The Licensing Act 1964 refers to
''a meal eaten by a person seated at a table, or at a counter or other structure that serves the purpose of a table and is not used for the service of refreshments for consumption by persons not seated at a table or structure serving the purpose of a table.''
 I take that to mean that someone cannot get away with eating at the bar. Timmis v. Millman of 1965 states 
''a substantial sandwich accompanied by pickles and beetroot was a table meal''.
 I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman. If I could, I would try to find for him a better definition of 
 what constitutes a substantial sandwich, because some of the ones that I have eaten were total rip-offs.

Mark Hoban: That explanation serves the purpose, and I just hope that 16 and 17-year-olds are not assiduously paying attention to the Committee's proceedings.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 148 - Consumption of alcohol by children

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 466, in
clause 148, page 80, line 37, leave out 'knowingly'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 469, in
clause 152, page 82, line 40, leave out 'knowingly'.

Malcolm Moss: Amendment No. 469 is consequential on amendment No. 466, as it would delete the same word in clause 152(1).
 Removing the word ''knowingly'' would make any individual who acted unlawfully properly accountable for their actions and ensure that the responsible person had to make every possible effort to ascertain the age of any individual selling or supplying alcohol from their premises. 
 The police have shown some concern too. Under the Licensing Act 1964, it is an offence for a person under 18 years of age to consume alcohol on licensed premises. The police say that that is effective and allows discretion over whether to prosecute on the merits of an individual case. The Bill has included the word ''knowingly'' in that provision. That presents the practical difficulty of proving the requisite guilty knowledge, and it could increase the likelihood of not guilty pleas to offences. There is also a risk that lengthy prosecution might not be considered to be in the public interest. 
 We want to reflect the concern made known to us by the police that the current law offers greater flexibility whereby a case can be judged on its merits. The insertion of the word ''knowingly'' might mean that more people register not guilty pleas. We are talking about an individual aged under 18 consuming alcohol on relevant premises, which, as we know, carries the considerable fine under subsection (5)(a) in respect of level 3. Anyone supplying or retailing alcohol is subject to the top level fine of level 5. Important strictures and penalties are therefore involved if the law is broken. The police fear that the measure will water down the rules and make their job of securing convictions in appropriate cases more difficult.

Kim Howells: Clause 148 makes it an offence, subject to the exception in defined circumstances for 16 and 17-year-olds that we have already debated, knowingly to consume alcohol. Amendment No. 466 would remove the qualification, ''knowingly''.
 The offence provision has been drafted to offer protection to individuals who have no way of knowing that the liquid that they are consuming contains alcohol. Perhaps the most obvious example is a birthday party for teenagers at a licensed premises or a qualifying club, where some bright spark thinks it would be a great idea to spike the fruit punch with vodka. Guests who consumed the punch thinking it to be alcohol free would, as a result of amendment No. 466, be committing an offence, which surely cannot be right. 
 It is important to note that the defence of due diligence, set out in clause 137, applies only to the offences in clause 134(1)(a), relating to unauthorised licensable activity; in clause 135, relating to exposing alcohol for unauthorised sale; and clause 136, relating to keeping alcohol on premises for unauthorised sale. It would be wholly inappropriate to introduce an equivalent defence for the consumption of alcohol by children. It would be unfair to expect a teenager to carry out the investigation necessary to measure up to that test. In addition, the individual concerned might never have consumed alcohol and would have no way of detecting the fact that the drink in front of them contained it. The amendment would risk criminalising innocent children, so I hope that it will not be pressed. 
 Clause 152 re-enacts in an updated form provisions under the Licensing Act 1964, so that it will be an offence for a responsible person as defined in the clause knowingly to allow an individual under the age of 18 to sell or, in the case of a club, to supply alcohol, unless each such sale or supply has been specifically approved. Amendment No. 469 would remove the qualification in respect of the person ''knowingly'' allowing an individual under the age of 18 to sell or, in the case of a club, to supply alcohol.

Malcolm Moss: Is the Minister saying that the word ''knowingly'' appears in current legislation and that such occurrences are not new, or is a word being introduced that has not appeared previously?

Kim Howells: I hope that, by the end of the sitting, I can acquire the exact words of the current legislation for the hon. Gentleman, as I do not have them in front of me. I will find out.
 Amendment No. 469 would expose anyone employing staff in a pub, or other premises supplying alcohol, to a high—and in the Government's view unacceptable—risk. An individual below the age of 18 may seek employment on the basis of the false premise that they are 18. They may seem to be well over 18, and could possess—indeed, in many cases have possessed—forged documentation to that effect. Even if the manager or owner took all reasonable steps to verify the age of the employee, he or she may end up with somebody under 18 on the books and supplying alcohol on the premises. 
 Amendment No. 469 would mean that, even under those circumstances, where a responsible person—for example, a designated premises supervisor—has gone to great lengths to establish the employee's bona fides, he or she would still be committing an offence under clause 152. That might lead to a situation in which the 
 hospitality and leisure industry shies away from employing young people at all, doing great damage to that industry and the economy as a whole. I do not wish to sound too dramatic, however, and we are coming to amendments that deal with serving alcohol as part of a meal in a restaurant, where the implications are even greater. I have tried to answer the question and I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not press the amendment.

Andrew Turner: The Minister referred to drinks being spiked. Do any provisions make it an offence to spike drinks?

Kim Howells: Any attempt to supply alcohol to children or persons under the age of 18 is an offence, and people who spike drinks could properly be prosecuted. The hon. Gentleman has spoken of the great dangers of drinks being spiked with other materials, not just alcohol. We have seen many harrowing examples of date rape, so we must come down on such behaviour like a ton of bricks.

Malcolm Moss: I listened carefully to the Minister's argument, particularly in relation to amendment No. 466. He sought to defend a situation where a teenager was not aware that his orange juice or whatever had been spiked with vodka or something similar.

Kim Howells: The hon. Gentleman asked me whether the use of the word ''knowingly'' is new. It is new in respect of the offence in clause 148 regarding children, and it reflects an unfortunate increase in the tendency of people to act irresponsibly in spiking drinks with alcohol or drugs.

Malcolm Moss: I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that matter. That fits in with the concerns expressed to us by the police who believe that there is a new concept being introduced here. In their eyes, it means that we are communicating their concern that young people might regularly use such a defence when challenged over consuming alcohol under the age of 18 by saying, ''Well, I didn't know. Somebody spiked my drink''.

Martin Linton: ''I thought it was lemonade, your worship.''

Malcolm Moss: Children may not get away with such an excuse in respect of beer, wine or cider, but they may when alcohol had been added to a soft drink or when they were drinking an alcopop in a glass. While we accept that there may be a genuine defence on the part of some individuals, the provision allows those who are committing an offence to get away with the, ''We didn't know, guv,'' excuse and to say that what happened was the fault of someone else. The police have a real fear that not-guilty pleas will increase as a result of the insertion of ''knowingly''. The Minister should deal with such matters in his discussions with the police to ensure that—

Andrew Turner: I did not mean to call my hon. Friend to a halt mid-sentence, but I thank him for giving way. Would it be possible for the Minister to come up with a compromise on Report between the use of ''knowingly'', which almost invites a range of spurious defences, and its absence? As has been
 explained, it makes it possible for someone to commit an offence when he genuinely does not know that he is drinking alcohol. We are putting an enormous burden on those who have to enforce the law in that respect, and we should not put any additional burden on them, if we can help it. The difficulty in enforcing law in respect of youngsters between the ages of 14 and 18 is particularly great.

Malcolm Moss: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I was about to make a similar suggestion. We accept the arguments that are being made. Teenagers whose drinks are spiked should be able to put up a reasonable defence against prosecution. If the Minister were right in saying that there is an increasing tendency for drinks to be spiked, perhaps we should concentrate on that and the supply of alcohol, and go down heavy on that. We may have passed the clause that covered spiking, but perhaps he will consider strengthening those parts of the Bill that cover supply to children and make it clear that spiking comes under supply, and that it is a serious offence.
 That may be how to tackle the problem, rather than give a range of young people under 18 an easy get-out in respect of convictions by their saying that they did not know that their drinks were spiked or had alcohol in them. Frankly, after two or three drinks, if they were not used to alcohol, they would know it was involved. I would have thought that at that point they could have desisted. If they had done so, the likelihood of their being caught would be limited. 
 I shall be happy to withdraw the amendment. We have had a good discussion, which has raised the point put to us by the police that needs dealing with. I hope that the Minister raises it again in his ongoing discussions.

Kim Howells: The hon. Gentleman used the phrase ''real fear''. The police rarely prosecute children for drinking under age, and so on. It would be interesting to know which police force has a real fear about the offence. I can tell him that there are fewer than 25 prosecutions nationwide each year. If the problem is a real fear for the police, it has not been translated into action through prosecution.

Malcolm Moss: I am looking through my notes for a letter that I received from Kent county constabulary. I have already quoted from it. It is from Jim Barker-McCardle, acting deputy chief constable, who is involved in area operations for Kent county constabulary.

Kim Howells: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that. We will certainly contact Kent county constabulary and ask it to tell us more about that real fear.

Malcolm Moss: I am grateful for that. I tabled the amendments only because we received that letter from the police and thought that it needed looking into. The Minister has now given an assurance and I hope that if it seems that things will go seriously wrong because of the inclusion of ''knowingly'', something can be done about it on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Turner: I am taking advantage of the stand part debate to ask the Minister whether he would be prepared to go into a little more detail about spiking drinks.

Kim Howells: I already have.

Andrew Turner: I know that the Minister has, but I am asking him, because my memory is not perfect, whether he could point to the clause that makes spiking unlawful. The provisions state that delivering alcohol to children is an offence only to those who are working on relevant premises.

Kim Howells: No, it is not.

Andrew Turner: The Minister says that it is not, but it would be great if he could explain where that is said. Clause 149 mentions a person
''who works on relevant premises''
 in subsection (1), who ''works on the premises'' in subsection (3), who ''works on the premises'' or is a 
''member or officer of the club''
 in subsection (5), and who 
''works on the relevant premises''
 in subsection (6). I see nothing about people who do not work on the premises.

Kim Howells: We discussed the issue of people aged 18 or over who buy alcohol in off-licences and shops and supply them to children outside under an earlier clause. That can be an offence, too. There is a whole tranche of people that the hon. Gentleman has not mentioned. He is talking about premises with a premises licence and qualifying clubs.

Andrew Turner: I accept that, but I interpreted ''on behalf of'' in clause 147—I think that is the clause to which the Minister refers—as meaning ''as the agent for the child under 18.'' Otherwise, clause 147(3) would make it an offence to buy a bottle of wine, take it home and allow one's child to drink a glass or half a glass of it, even if the rest of the bottle was to be consumed by the family.

Kim Howells: I assure the hon. Gentleman that that is not an offence and that parents are quite within the law if they purchase alcohol for the home and decide to allow their children to drink it.

Andrew Turner: Good; I am pleased to hear that. So, my interpretation of ''on behalf of'' was right. That suggests that it is not clause 147 that makes it an offence to spike a drink, because that relies on the interpretation of ''on behalf of'' as an agent, and most people who spike drinks are not acting as the agent of the spikee.

Kim Howells: Spikee?

Andrew Turner: I suppose that the rest of the drink is the spikee, but the Minister knows what I mean. Where is the provision that makes it an offence to spike drinks? I would be grateful for the Minister's clarification.

Kim Howells: The ''spikee'' has committed an offence under clause 147(4)(a) if he spikes a child's drink. He has purchased alcohol for consumption by a minor on licensed premises.

Andrew Turner: It may not even take place on licensed premises.

Kim Howells: Let me go back to an answer that I gave previously. The offence provision has been drafted to offer protection to individuals who have no way of knowing that the liquid that they are consuming contains alcohol. Perhaps the most obvious situation where that might happen is at a birthday party for teenagers at a licensed premises or a qualifying club.

Andrew Turner: Indeed, but it is not necessary for someone to have bought the alcohol on the premises for him to put it into a drink. I know of a few people who make a habit of going into licensed premises with a small flask of alcohol—perhaps even a flask of pre-prepared gin and tonic—because they prefer not to pay the prices that the landlord charges. They do not mind buying one glass, but they top it up surreptitiously on the premises—only with the gin, or with the tonic, too. Someone does not need to have purchased alcohol on the premises to be capable of spiking a drink.

Kim Howells: It does not matter where the alcohol was purchased. The act of spiking the drink—of supplying alcohol to minors—is the offence. The ''spikee'' commits the offence even if the alcohol was bought in a supermarket.

Jim Knight: The spiker.

Kim Howells: Sorry, I meant to say the spiker.

Andrew Turner: The person who has brought along a flask of gin and who pours some of it into a non-alcoholic drink, or increases the alcohol content of a drink with some of it, has bought or attempted to buy the drink but it may not have been his intention when he bought it to add it to other drinks. If someone buys a bottle of gin, it may well be their intention that it will be consumed only by people who are over 18. Therefore, they have not committed the offence of buying it for consumption by an individual under 18: they have merely enabled a person under 18 unknowingly to consume it.
 I wish the Minister to think again about this as I suspect that there is a loophole that will be taken advantage of, which means that people will buy gin in a supermarket, put it in a flask that they wear on their hip, and, on a whim, pour a goodly quantity of it into the non-alcoholic drink of a girl of 14 or 15—or, possibly, of somebody of 17 who is going to drive. Such situations might arise and they do not involve the purchasing of alcohol for consumption by a person under 18.

Kim Howells: Basically, the hon. Gentleman is asking me whether the Bill makes it an offence to supply or to attempt to supply alcoholic drink to a child, regardless of whether it is a spiked drink or a drink bought in a recognised container. The answer is yes, regardless of whether it is supplied by sale, retail or a club. Clause 44 provides for that.

Andrew Turner: I wish to have an opportunity to re-read that clause. However, I do not want to detain the Committee, so I would be happy to re-read it while we debate the next clause.
 Question put and agreed to 
 Clause 148 ordered to stand part.

Clause 149 - Delivering alcohol to children

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Turner: Now that I have had the opportunity to re-read clause 144—

Joe Benton: Order. We are now debating clause 149 and I cannot allow a debate on previous clauses.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 149 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 150 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 151 disagreed to.

Clause 152 - Prohibition of unsupervised sales by children

Malcolm Moss: I beg to move amendment No. 470, in
clause 152, page 83, line 5, leave out subsection (2).
 The Minister alluded to the clause earlier when we were dealing with the supply of alcohol with table meals. Clause 152 deals with children under 18 supplying alcohol at a table. It is also a concern that has been expressed to us by the same source, that is, the same police assistant chief constable. That should be taken on board in the discussions that the Minister or his officials will have with that person. 
 The Bill contains a provision that allows a young person under 18 years of age to sell and serve alcohol to persons having a table meal in licensed premises without an adult authorising the sale. The police are concerned that in those circumstances the young person making the sale or serving the alcohol may be vulnerable to intimidation by drunken or under-age customers—to use their words. 
 Amendment No. 470 would delete the whole of subsection (2), which states: 
''But subsection (1) does not apply where . . . the alcohol is sold or supplied for consumption with a table meal . . . it is sold or supplied in premises which are being used for the service of table meals . . . the premises are . . . not used for the sale or supply of alcohol otherwise than to persons having table meals there and for consumption by such a person as an ancillary to his meal.''
 That suggests that there does not have to be approval by an individual over 18 years or, as stated in subsection (1)(b), a ''responsible person''. We would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the implications of under-18s serving alcohol to those eating table meals while not necessarily being supervised.

Kim Howells: Clause 152 re-enacts in up-to-date terms provisions in the Licensing Act 1964 to the effect that it is an offence knowingly to allow an individual under the age of 18 to sell or, in the case of a club, supply alcohol unless each sale or supply has been
 specifically approved by a responsible person, as defined in the clause.
 Subsection (2) provides that the offence is not committed where the alcohol is sold for consumption with a table meal in a part of the premises used only for that purpose. We have had some discussion about how that is defined. The effect of that important exception is that a minor will, for example, be able to serve alcohol in a restaurant. Amendment No. 470 would remove that exception. The Government cannot accept that and I hope to persuade the hon. Gentleman of the merits of our case. 
 Some of our colleagues are familiar with the many excellent eateries that are found in striking distance of the Palace of Westminster. I know that hon. Members have some knowledge of the inside of restaurants in that area. They will also know that, subject to employment law, waiting at tables is an important employment opportunity for young people under 18. 
 If amendment No. 470 were agreed, every time a diner ordered a glass of wine the young waiter would have to return to the bar to obtain specific authorisation to make the sale. That would lead to massive disruption to the long-standing practices of restaurant management and operation that we are all used to and have experienced on many occasions. In practice, that would mean that many, perhaps most, restaurants would cease to employ people under 18, which would result in a significant blow to the employment opportunities available to that age group. 
 The Bill contains important back-ups, in the form of offences relating to the consumption of alcohol by, and sale of alcohol to, minors. Those continue to operate, regardless of the age of the person who makes the sale. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see the seriousness posed to a large part of the hospitality industry by the amendment and that he will not press it.

Malcolm Moss: I am grateful for the Minister's explanation. However, I understand the clause as follows: someone who is under 18 who sells or supplies alcohol can do so if that is specifically approved by a responsible person. Subsection (2), however, would remove that requirement. I cannot see that there would be a problem if a young waiter or waitress took an alcohol order at a table then went to the bar and said, ''Table 6 wants three gin and tonics and two whiskies.'' The approval comes from the manager or the barman—it is the responsibility of the establishment—not from the young person who takes the order and gives it to the bar. The young person is simply a conduit or carrier of the alcohol from A to B. We are concerned about the lack of supervision implied in the clause. If a responsible manager were there at all times, there would be blanket coverage so that the young people could take orders and supply alcohol. I am a little confused.

Kim Howells: It is strange that the police have not raised their concerns over the past 40 years—at least since 1961—because during that time waiters and waitresses under 18 have been permitted to sell alcohol with meals. There must be somebody on the licensed
 premises who is over 18, has a proper premises licence and is responsible for the sale of alcohol on the occasion that the public are allowed to consume it. There will be somebody there who has such qualifications.

Malcolm Moss: In the light of those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 152 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 153 - Enforcement role for weights and measures authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Turner: The clause provides for the enforcement role of weights and measures authorities and refers only to two clauses. I shall ask the Minister some questions on this and other relevant clauses, from 143 to 152. The first question is, why is the enforcement role limited to clauses 144 and 145? I would have thought that weights and measures inspectors on premises that are licensed for the sale of alcohol are in a perfect position to enforce aspects of other clauses, not merely those of clauses 144 and 145.
 The second question relates to the enforcement of clause 144. The Minister has just said that that clause makes it an offence to spike a drink—[Interruption.] That is what he said.

Joe Benton: Order. It is difficult to see the relevance of what the hon. Gentleman is saying to the clause under discussion. I must ask him to confine his remarks to clause 153.

Andrew Turner: I may indeed do so, Mr. Benton, but I was considering whether the weights and measures inspectors would have a broader scope for action than merely that given under clauses 144 and 145. The Minister's assertion is that clause 144 makes it unlawful to sell a drink to someone who subsequently decides to use it to spike a drink. However, if that assertion turns out to be incorrect, which I believe it is, and that act is not covered by clause 145, the weights and measures inspector will have no role in protecting people from having their drinks spiked regardless of whether they are under or over 18. If someone under 18 has their drink spiked, I hope that someone will be enforcing the law—[Interruption.] The Minister is chuntering.

Kim Howells: Clause 153 is of no relevance to anything to do with spiking drinks. Although the hon. Gentleman is peeved that we did not collapse before his great logic, he should understand that the clause is about a specific matter.

Andrew Turner: Of course it is, but—

Joe Benton: Order. Before the hon. Gentleman resumes, I would like to be a little more definitive. We are discussing clause 153. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is referring to clause 144, but we cannot go back over old ground. We must confine ourselves to the clause under discussion. The hon. Gentleman does not seem to be describing an example, but constantly referring back to a previous clause, and we cannot have that. I ask him to confine his remarks to clause 153.

Andrew Turner: I take your advice, Mr. Benton.
 Will the Minister explain why clause 145 is appropriate for enforcement by weights and measures inspectors, but clauses 147 and 149 are not? Clauses 147 and 149 are just as much designed for the protection of those who are under 18 as clauses 144 and 145. I am interested in whether the Minister has a logical reason for that, or whether there is something specific about clauses 144 and 145 that makes them singularly appropriate to be enforced by weights and measures authorities rather than by other authorities. I would have liked to have asked other questions too, but Mr. Benton has ruled, I am sure rightly, that it would be out of order for me to refer to them in too much detail. 
 Regardless of whether a provision appears in clauses 144 or 147, I am concerned that people should not be in danger of having their drinks spiked. We got on to that subject because of clause 145 and the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Cambridgeshire which would delete the word ''knowingly'' from clauses 145 and 148. If it is appropriate for weights and measures authorities to enforce clause 145, in which ''knowingly'' appears, it is equally appropriate for them to enforce clause 148. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 153 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned accordingly till this day at half-past Two o'clock.